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DONALD C. CLARKE*

“Nothing But Wind”?
The Past and Future of Comparative
Corporate Governance†
Corporate law scholarship has come a long way since Bayless
Manning some four decades ago famously pronounced it dead. Not
only has doctrinal scholarship continued its project of critique and
rationalization, but empirical and economic approaches have injected
new life into the field.
Recent years have seen the rise of comparative corporate governance (CCG) as an increasingly mainstream approach within the world
of corporate governance studies. This is a function partly of an increasing international orientation on the part of legal scholars and
partly of an increasingly empirical turn in corporate law scholarship
generally. Different practices in other jurisdictions present at least the
possibility of natural experiments that attempt to find causal relationships between particular features of a corporate governance regime
and real-world outcomes. This body of research has become particularly relevant as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century.
The financial crisis has called into question many of our traditional
ways of thinking about corporate governance and the relationship between business enterprises and the state. Are there other countries that
do it better?
This Article discusses what is unique about CCG as an approach
to corporate governance studies. It begins by examining the concepts of
corporate governance and comparative corporate governance, making
the point that comparative corporate governance has in general been
focused on agency problems between shareholders and managers but
need not be so. It then looks at methodological issues in comparative
corporate governance, critiquing in particular economic Darwinist
theories and the failure of theories of international competition in corporate governance to incorporate the notion of comparative advantage.
Finally, it reviews major lessons learned from this body of work and
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I wish to thank
Larry Ribstein for our many conversations about corporate law and for inspiring me
to write this Article, and Barry Naughton for his close reading and helpful
suggestions.
† DOI 10.5131/AJCL.2010.0016
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suggests direction for future research. Among other things, it calls for
more comparative research into alternative business entities dubbed
“uncorporations” by Larry Ribstein and into corporate governance in
increasingly important economies such as China and India.

I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law scholarship has come a long way since Bayless
Manning some four decades ago famously pronounced it dead, with
“nothing left but our great empty corporate statutes—towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing
nothing but wind.”1 Not only has doctrinal scholarship continued its
project of critique and rationalization,2 but empirical and economic
approaches have injected new life into the field.
Recent years have seen the rise of comparative corporate governance (CCG) as an increasingly mainstream approach within the
world of corporate governance studies. In part, this stems from a recognition by legal scholars—traditionally somewhat insular in most
countries, and perhaps even more so in the United States—that
globalization calls for an increased understanding of how things are
done in the rest of the world. And in part, it is a function of an increasingly empirical turn in corporate law scholarship generally.
Different practices in other jurisdictions present at least the possibility of natural experiments that attempt to find causal relationships
between particular features of a corporate governance regime and
real-world outcomes.
What specifically is unique about CCG as an approach to corporate governance studies? What have we learned, and where should
we go? These questions are particularly urgent as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century. The financial crisis has called
into question (if it has not yet, perhaps, definitively overturned)
many of our traditional ways of thinking about corporate governance

1. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
2. By “rationalization” I mean attempts to rid doctrine of irrationalities and inconsistencies; I do not mean providing apologetics for the status quo. A personal
favorite in the critique-and-rationalization genre is Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1999).
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and the relationship between business enterprises and the state.3
Are there other countries that do it better?4
But there is another economic trend that makes comparative corporate governance research more urgent than ever: the rise of what
we might call “non-traditional” jurisdictions. As this Article will
show, CCG research has dealt extensively and skillfully with AngloAmerican jurisdictions, Europe, and Japan. But the last thirty years
have seen a startling rise in the economic importance of other countries, particularly China and the rest of non-Japan Asia. From 1980
to 2006, for example, China’s share of world GDP (estimated on the
basis of purchasing-power parity) rose from about three percent to
about sixteen percent. The rest of non-Japan Asia went from about
twelve percent to about eighteen percent.5 Students of business organization simply cannot ignore what is going on in those countries.
With these questions in mind, this Article reviews where we
have come in the last several years and the prospects for the future.
Part II examines and clarifies the concepts of corporate governance
and comparative corporate governance in order to set the stage for
the ensuing discussion. It makes the point that comparative corporate governance has in general—although not uncontroversially—
been focused on agency problems between shareholders and managers. It need not, however, always be so.
Part III looks at the methodology of comparative corporate governance, focusing particularly on the problems of functionalism and
empirical studies.
Part IV reviews briefly some of the major lessons learned from
comparative corporate governance scholarship, while Part V lays out
some future directions and challenges for research, focusing particularly on the vexed problem of convergence. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
3. See, e.g., DAVID A. WESTBROOK, AFTER THE CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR CAPITAL
MARKETS (2009); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate
Theory and Practice (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461143
(examining the unforeseen consequences for corporate and securities law of widespread government ownership of large corporations). Alan Greenspan famously
recanted his belief that “the self-interest of lending institutions [would] protect shareholders’ equity,” see Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://tinyurl.com/5onusv, and Richard Posner’s apostasy is in print as RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE
CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). On the turmoil in the Chicago School generally, see John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago, THE NEW YORKER, Jan.
11, 2010, at 28.
4. This is the suggestion of Paul Krugman in a recent column; see Paul Krugman, An Irish Mirror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, available at http://tinyurl.com/
ybrklxj.
5. See Jim Manzi, A Post-American World?, THE AMERICAN SCENE, May 7, 2008,
available at http://www.theamericanscene.com/2008/05/07/a-post-american-world.
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COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

A. The Concept of Corporate Governance
To understand the field of CCG, we must first clarify how the
field understands the notion of corporate governance itself. Corporate
governance can mean many things to many people, and the definition
typically will depend on what the definer cares about. I canvass some
definitions below in order to clarify what CCG typically excludes as
well as includes.6
The simplest definition may be that of the (British) Committee
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the Cadbury Report, which defines corporate governance as “the system by which
companies are directed and controlled.”7 Economist Margaret Blair
also supplies a broad definition: “the whole set of legal, cultural, and
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised,
and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are
allocated.”8
Institutional economists favor a narrower definition. Oliver Williamson, for example, sets out in his chapter on corporate governance
to examine the relationship between the firm and what he calls its
constituencies: labor, capital (equity and debt), suppliers, customers,
the community, and management.9 This conception of corporate governance in essence tries to cover all who participate in some way in
the process by which a firm’s product is produced and sold. It sees
these parties as voluntarily interacting with the firm, and asks what
the terms are on which they interact as well as why those terms look
the way they do. “Governance” in the work of Williamson and others
of the same school refers to the institutional structure parties set up
to deal with the inevitable incompleteness of their contracting, and
attempts to explain voluntary relationships in those terms.
Finally, some scholars use a quite narrow concept of corporate
governance. This concept is concerned with issues of finance and
agency cost and has a policy component: the prevention of the exploitation of those who supply the money by those who control it.10 It
6. This review of corporate governance definitions draws on my discussion in
Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 143-44.
7. Financial Reporting Council, London Stock Exchange, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 2.5 (1992), available at http://
www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=132.
8. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (1996).
9. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
10. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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centers on the relationship between stockholders, the board of directors, and senior management, and in effect asks, with Shleifer and
Vishny, “[H]ow can financiers be sure that, once they sink their funds
[into a firm], they get anything but a worthless piece of paper back
from the manager?”11
The approaches of the Cadbury Report and of Blair are typically
too broad for CCG. In its simplicity, the definition of the Cadbury
Report does little more than repeat the term “corporate governance”
using different words. At the same time, the Blair definition seems to
encompass not only shareholder-management relations and other internal governance institutions, but also external constraints such as
environmental and labor regulations.12 Such a definition might be
useful for some purposes, but it is not generally used in CCG. Instead, CCG has typically focused on the issues implicated in the
approaches of Shleifer and Vishny and of Williamson: (1) agency
problems between investors and management—i.e., the narrow definition of corporate governance—and in particular how this is related
to ownership patterns; and (2) shareholder versus stakeholder theories—i.e., questions of for whose benefit the corporation should be
run.13
B. The Concept of CCG
Once we have decided what corporate governance is, it would
seem to follow that comparative corporate governance involves asking what other jurisdictions do and seeing how they differ. But such
inquiries do not take place in a realm of abstract purposelessness;
they are invariably driven by some purpose of the inquirer. Thus, the
question of “what is CCG?” can best be answered by asking “why do
CCG?”
11. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 740-41 (1997). In Edward Rock’s words,
The question that has motivated many American corporate law scholars
since Berle and Means, and certainly much recent scholarship, has been, at
heart, the question of how we can make managers sufficiently accountable so
that they will manage the corporation for the shareholders.
Edward C. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 389 (1996).
12. This is not completely clear. In restricting her definition to public corporations, Blair may mean only such restrictions as apply only to public corporations as
such.
13. See generally John Cioffi, State of the Art [Review Essay], 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
501, 507 (2000) (noting discussion of whose interests the corporation is supposed to
serve); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Comparative Corporate Governance and Pedagogy,
34 GA. L. REV. 721, 723 (2000) (noting that comparison is typically on the basis of
financing characteristics); Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance, 23 WISC. INT’L L.J. 477, 477 (2005); Gregory Jackson,
Comparative Corporate Governance: Sociological Perspectives, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 265, 270 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly
eds., 2000) (criticizing focus on agency costs).
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CCG began, and continues, as an approach to corporate governance studies that found inspiration for solutions to problems in one
jurisdiction by looking at the practice of other jurisdictions. The policy orientation is explicit.14 It has developed into something much
richer, however, and now encompasses studies that are aimed less at
policy recommendations than at simply attempting to understand,
through comparison of different regimes, why certain approaches to
common problems work or do not work in different contexts.15
These studies have also taken various approaches to comparison.
Some studies have been of single countries, in which the explicit comparative lesson, if any, comes tacked on at the end. Thus, we see
studies of takeover law in England16 or derivative suits in Japan17 or
fiduciary duties in China.18 Some studies explicitly take a few countries that are similar enough to make comparison worthwhile—for
example, they are all advanced economies—but that have differences
from which hopefully something can be learned.19 These studies examine particular national solutions in great detail.
Then there is the “LLSV” and LLSV-inspired literature,20 which
codes particular traits of national corporate governance regimes in a
14. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND
EMERGING RESEARCH v (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“[T]he ability to give welfareenhancing recommendations is still poor and needs substantial improvement.”). A
good example of this type of approach is John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate
Scandals: Why the United States and Europe Differ, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POST-ENRON: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Joseph J. Norton,
Jonathan Rickford & Jan Kleineman eds., 2006).
15. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, at v (“Comparative corporate governance research may bring forth new insights that research
conducted only within one system may fail to produce.”). Two good examples of this
type of approach—trying to explain what we see, without aiming for specific policy
recommendations—are Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 165,
165 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997), and PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES
SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005).
16. See, e.g., Tony Shea, Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom, 16
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 89 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name:
Anglo-American Fiduciary Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST
ASIA 193 (Hideki Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2008).
19. See John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical
Comparison of the UK and US, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687 (2009).
20. “LLSV literature” refers to a series of studies by the economists Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Representative early works are Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT. ECON. 1113 (1998) (hereinafter Law and Finance); 2nd Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
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large number of countries and then attempts to correlate those traits
with other features of a country’s economy, such as per capita GDP or
capital market development.
In some cases, scholars have used law to explain economic and
financial phenomena. For example, the LLSV literature asserts that
patterns of dispersed shareholding can be explained by the rights
shareholders are given under the law. The common law protects minority shareholders and therefore supports dispersed shareholding;
civil law systems do not, and therefore blockholding emerges as the
efficient solution to agency problems. And Mark Roe has had a major
influence on the field by arguing, on the basis of the experience of
different jurisdictions, that what supports dispersion is not laws on
shareholder rights so much as it is populist-inspired legal restrictions
on economic concentrations.21
At other times, scholars have used economics and finance to explain law. John Coffee, for example,22 argues that “[m]uch historical
evidence suggests that legal developments have tended to follow,
rather than precede, economic change[,]”23 and Stuart Banner
surveys three centuries of international history to argue that waves
of securities regulation typically follow securities market collapses
(and are therefore not attributable to broader political factors such as
populism à la Roe).24
The “why” of CCG can perhaps best be explained through its history. Although CCG came into its own in the 1990s, its modern
reform-oriented version can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s.
Ever since Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and
Private Property,25 American corporate law scholarship has been focused on the separation of ownership from control, and on the ways of
mitigating the problems created by that separation. But the problems
stubbornly persisted, and it seemed impossible that directors could
ever truly play a significant role in managing the corporation, given
their limitations of time and information. The late 1960s and early
1970s then saw essentially the abandonment of the ideal of the managing board; the board was reconceptualized as a body that
monitored but did not manage. As part of this shift in thinking,
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 71 (1999) (hereinafter Corporate Ownership).
Three of the group summarize their work in Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LIT. 285 (2008) (hereinafter Economic Consequences).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31.
22. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001).
23. Id. at 7.
24. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
25. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).

R
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American academics began to look in particular at the German system of a two-tier board.26
At the same time, CCG scholarship remained largely doctrinal,
focusing on differences in rules.27 Ronald Gilson writes that prior to
globalization, “[t]his area of scholarship had been largely the domain
of taxonomists, intent on cataloguing the central characteristics of
national corporate governance systems, and then classifying different
systems based on the specified attributes.”28
Several events brought gradual changes to this picture. First, as
early as 1976, Jensen and Meckling’s seminal article, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,29 turned the focus of corporate law scholarship in the United
States to issues of agency cost and ownership structure. This focus
naturally made American scholars interested in ownership structures outside the United States and in the implications of their
differences. Second, Mark Roe’s work on the political roots of American corporate ownership patterns and their associated governance
institutions30 suggested that corporate governance might be not just
a matter of market-driven evolution toward an optimal set of arrangements, but instead the product of political choices.31 Other
scholarship showed that the lifetime employment system in Japan,
26. See generally Rock, supra note 11, at 368-73.
27. See, e.g., André Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law
and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 757 (1982); ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 75-93 (1976); see generally Pinto, supra note 13, at 477,
482.
28. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128, 128
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
29. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
30. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
31. Professor Roe’s work is not unchallenged. John Coffee has argued that
[t]he most convincing explanation for this sharp disparity [between the importance of equity markets in the U.S. and in France, Germany and Italy] is
that only those legal systems that provide significant protections for minority
investors can develop active equity markets . . . . But once this explanation is
accepted, it amounts to a rejection of the “political theory” offered by Professor Roe and others.
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History; The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 644 (1999). Ronald
Gilson briefly summarizes his view of the merits of the two positions in Gilson, supra
note 28, at 134-35 n.21.
Brian Cheffins has also challenged the Roe thesis, pointing out that Britain, despite its very different politics, has developed a capital market and ownership
structure very similar to that of the United States. See Brian R. Cheffins, Putting
Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United
Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES—CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 147
(Joseph McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luke Renneboog eds., 2001).
The most extended and sophisticated approach to political explanations of corporate governance patterns of which I am aware is GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 15.
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explained variously as a venerable tradition or as an effort to encourage workers to invest in human capital, in fact grew out of a
postwar political deal.32 What all this meant was that the institutions of any one country were not necessarily the most efficient ones
for it, and thus research into alternatives could have real payoffs.33
Finally, as globalization made issues of national competitiveness
increasingly salient, scholars viewed governance systems as competing in much the same way that products do.34 CCG studies began to
proliferate in the 1980s and 1990s. When Japan and Germany were
riding high economically in the 1980s, there was great interest in the
apparent strengths of German and Japanese models and what was
thought to be their contribution to economic performance both at the
corporate and at the national level. Some scholars produced studies
of the monitoring benefits of the Japanese main bank system35 and
keiretsu structure,36 while others argued that American equity markets forced executives to focus on quarterly results whereas “the bank
centered capital markets of Germany and Japan allowed executives
to manage in the long run.”37 In a word, Japan and Germany were

32. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and
the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COL. L. REV. 508 (1999); Gilson,
supra note 28, at 129.
33. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 130.
34. Id. at 129.
35. See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 27
J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1990); Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A
Survey and Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH 11 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994); THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK
SYSTEM (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).
36. Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 271
(1993); Eric Berglof & Enrico Peroti, The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial Keiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (1994). Mark Ramseyer and Yoshiro Miwa deny the
existence of both the main bank system and the keiretsu structure in a series of articles collected in YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, URBAN LEGENDS OF THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY (2006). The relevant articles are Yoshiro Miwa & Mark J. Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002) and Yoshiro Miwa & Mark J. Ramseyer, The Fable of
the Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 169 (2002). Curtis Milhaupt challenges the challengers in Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main
Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
425 (2002), as do three other Japanese law scholars in Luke Nottage, Leon Wolff &
Kent Anderson, Japan’s Gradual Transformation in Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: JAPAN’S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION 1, 2
(Luke Nottage, Leon Wolff & Kent Anderson eds., 2009) (calling the Ramseyer-Miwa
account “iconoclastic and idiosyncratic”). See also Luke Nottage, Perspectives and Approaches: A Framework for Comparing Japanese Corporate Governance, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: JAPAN’S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION
21, supra (citing studies rebutting the Ramseyer-Miwa account).
37. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 130.
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going to eat our lunch unless we improved our corporate governance
system.38
By later in the 1990s, however, the worm had turned, and the
U.S. economy seemed to be outperforming the others. CCG then became, for both Americans and many non-Americans, a study of the
superiority of the American system in raising capital and constraining agency costs.39 The focus changed from importing foreign
practices to exporting American ones.40 But whoever was viewed as
on top, the research agenda of CCG had pretty much crystallized by
this time: in the words of two leading scholars in 1999, “In these
globalizing times, corporate law’s leading question is whether there is
a national corporate governance system (or component thereof) that
possesses relative competitive advantage.”41 The second question
that dominated the field was what the future would bring: if one
model was indeed better than another, would national corporate governance regimes converge? Or would national differences remain?
There was by then no shortage of excellent and detailed studies,42 but the question of convergence seemed as unsettled as ever.
Into this morass of doubt and uncertainty, Hansmann and Kraakman
in 2001 tossed their bombshell, entitled “The End of History for Corporate Law”:43 the debate was over, U.S.-style corporate governance
had won, convergence had already taken place at the ideological
level, and formal convergence was “only a matter of time.”44 I shall
return to this claim later.
Alongside the discussion of convergence, carried on largely by legal scholars, was a parallel research agenda carried on largely by
economists that sought to draw causal links between features of a
country’s legal system—in particular, its rules about corporate governance—and various economic indicators. This body of research was
launched in the late 1990s by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV) with several arti38. See, e.g., Michael Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65; Joseph Grundfest,
Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995); Curtis Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the
United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 865 (1997).
40. See generally the history recounted in William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case
Against Global Cross-Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 235 et seq. (1999).
41. Id.
42. See, for example, the mammoth COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 14. For an extensive review, see Cioffi, supra note 13.
43. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEORGETOWN L.J. 439 (2001).
44. Id. at 439.
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cles on law, finance, and corporate governance,45 and the authors
have continued, both together and with other collaborators, to produce research in this vein in subsequent years. While the
methodology of this research has been criticized,46 it is sufficient for
present purposes to note that its conclusion—that law mattered—added new urgency to the quest for optimal corporate governance rules.
In addition, the work of financial economists such as LLSV has
moved CCG out of the realm of traditional corporate law. Not only are
economists getting into the game, but business school professors—
which could only be expected—political scientists,47 and sociologists48 are doing so as well.
III. METHODOLOGIES

OF

COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Functionalism and its Problems
The overall methodology of CCG has traditionally been, and remains, functionalism. In other words, the scholar identifies a need or
a function or a problem that is shared by several jurisdictions, and
then asks how they address it.49 The solutions will by definition be
functionally equivalent and therefore comparable. This approach is
widely used in comparative law generally.50 An often-cited example
in the CCG field is Ronald Gilson’s “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function.”51 In this paper, Professor
Gilson explicitly takes a function-centered approach to CCG in examining various problems, stating, for example, that “[a]ny successful
system must find a way to replace poorly performing senior managers,”52 and then showing that different systems manage to do it with
similar levels of efficiency despite formally different structures. As
noted above, CCG scholarship has traditionally taken the cross-na45. See supra the works cited at note 20.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 66-73.
47. See Mary O’Sullivan, The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance, 10 REV. POLIT. ECON. 23 (2003), and sources cited in the bibliography;
GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 15.
48. See, e.g., Neil Fligstein & Jennifer Choo, Law and Corporate Governance
(Mar. 2005); Neil Fligstein & Robert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Corporate Organization, 21 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 21 (1995); Jackson, supra
note 13.
49. See, e.g., PETRI MANTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS AS A RULE-MAKER 12 (2005) (“The functional method . . . means the
comparison of how a social need has been dealt with by legal norms.”). The classic
statement of functionalism in sociology is TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM
(1951).
50. See, for example, LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES (John Barton et al.
eds., 1983) (examining the treatment of “inheritance,” “embezzlement,” and “contract”
in various jurisdictions).
51. Gilson, supra note 28.
52. Id.

R
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tional problem to be that of minimizing agency costs in the
shareholder-management relationship.
Although this approach has been praised as “value-neutral,”53
the injection of values into a study is in fact unavoidable, and can
only be managed, not eliminated. First, values enter the picture because there is no objective way of knowing what function or need a
particular practice serves. What is a problem in one system may not
be a problem (or perceived as one) in another. The very act of deciding
what is a problem involves a value judgment. Thus, for example, the
separation of ownership and control is perceived as a central problem
in American corporate law and is therefore assumed often to be a central problem in other jurisdictions.54 But it has been embraced as a
solution in much of Chinese corporate governance discourse.55 While
one could argue (as I have)56 that this discourse misconceives the nature of the problem that separating ownership from control is
supposed to solve, the fact remains that a search for Chinese solutions to the “problem” of this separation is going to yield odd results.
This leads to the second problem: that if the function is exogenously determined, we can always, if we look hard enough, find
something that we judge attempts to accomplish it. Consider this
passage from Max Gluckman’s The Judicial Process Among the
Barotse:
[I]n contract cases the court begins by defining the social positions of the litigants: buyer and seller, lender and
borrower, employer and servant, cattle-owner and herder,
owner and share-cropper in fishing, partners. These positions are linked by agreement (tumelano), in sale (muleko) or
barter (musintana), loan (kukalimela), employment
(kusebezisa), herding (kufisa), share-fishing (munonelo), or
partnership (kopanyo).57
It may well be that the Lozi terms in question are the closest one
can get to the English term preceding it. And it is of course possible
that Lozi society happened to come up with a legal system that also
uses abstract definitions such as “buyer” and “seller,” “lender” and
“borrower,” and so on, and has business organizations like partnerships as we know them. But one cannot escape the suspicion that
53. See Mantysaari, supra note 49, at 11.
54. See, e.g., Gilson & Roe, supra note 36, at 871, 874 (“To date, comparative analyses of the Japanese corporate governance system have assumed that the central
purpose of the Japanese system, like that of the American system, is solving the
Berle-Means monitoring problem.”).
55. See Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA
ECON. REV. 494, 497-98 (2003).
56. See id.
57. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) 315 (1955).
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Gluckman began with the concept from English or Roman-Dutch law,
proceeded to look for its equivalent, and inevitably (because the
methodology required it) found one.58
A third problem with functionalism crops up when starting not
with a posited function, but instead coming from the other direction:
starting with an institution and attempting to attribute to it a function. In Teemu Ruskola’s colorful example,
Explaining in a functionalist framework why the medieval
French chose to try rats, for example, would require considerable ingenuity. How would one even begin to frame the
inquiry? (“How did the French deal with the problem of criminal rodents in the Middle Ages?” Or, “How did medieval
French law address cross-species disputes?”)59
Thus, we might see a foreign practice as a response to the “need” to
limit controlling-shareholder exploitation of non-controlling shareholders, whereas in fact it serves some other, quite different social
purpose.60 This risk is admittedly small when we are looking at foreign jurisdictions similar to our own, and where there is considerable
cross-communication among scholars, so that we have a good sense of
how people in the jurisdiction in question view the practice. But once
we move to more unfamiliar and exotic jurisdictions without much of
a shared legal tradition, and in particular if we do not go below the
surface but simply code the rules on the books, the danger of missing
something important is very high.
Finally, functionalism is problematic because it requires one in
effect to take for granted the function that is served in the analyst’s
home jurisdiction. For example, much of the discussion in CCG is
over whether there is a single optimal form of corporate governance,
and if so, what it is. But although this discussion has resulted in
many different views, even to have it requires agreement on what
corporate governance is supposed to be optimizing. Although many
would say it is or should be about maximizing shareholder returns,
there is a sizable dissent from those associated with stakeholder theory and the progressive corporate governance school.
None of this is to condemn functionalism out of hand or to deny
its usefulness in some circumstances. Many corporate governance re58. See Paul Bohannon’s critique of what he calls “backward translation” in Paul
Bohannon, Ethnology and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE
AND SOCIETY 401, 410-11 (Laura Nader ed., 1969).
59. Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 203-34 (2002).
60. Roberto Romano, for example, posits that institutional blockholding in Germany and Japan exists not to minimize agency costs in that particular institutional
environment, but to prevent hostile takeovers or to allow the blockholders “to safeguard or favor their non-shareholder positions at the public shareholders’ expense.”
See Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2033 (1993).
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gimes do indeed face common problems. For example, to whom do
assets used by the corporation belong, and to whose creditors shall
they be made available? Who can act for the corporation, and how
shall that actor’s performance be monitored and controlled? CCG
studies have gotten a great deal of mileage out of the comparative
approach by showing how similar results can sometimes be achieved
in spite of different formal legal norms.61 Functionalism can also be
useful in naturalizing the exotic, as it were; in showing that what
seems at first glance to be utterly strange can in fact be reduced to
familiar terms. As CCG extends its reach beyond the familiar jurisdictions of the industrialized world to transition and developing
economies, this approach may still prove valuable. The key is to be
alert to, and avoid, functionalism’s tendency to reduce to familiar
terms that which truly is exotic, thereby hiding precisely what is different and interesting about it.
B. Cross-Sectional Studies Versus Longitudinal Studies
A marked feature of CCG in recent years has been its focus on
cross-sectional studies. These studies can examine the relative efficiency of given structures at given times and yield policy
recommendations, but do not tell us how structures change over
time.62 One notable exception is an admirable 2002 study by
Katharina Pistor and her colleagues of the evolution of corporate law
in several jurisdictions since about the late eighteenth century.63 Another exception is a 2001 article by Mark West showing how
Japanese corporate law began after World War II looking like Illinois
corporate law, and then gradually diverged over time.64 West then
uses this phenomenon to develop a theory about the differences between Japanese and U.S. corporate law understood as systems; it is
their larger unchanging features that explain the way subsidiary features change over time.
C. Empirical Studies using Standardized Data
The well-known LLSV literature and its progeny are empirical
studies using standardized data.65 Particular areas of importance are
61. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 28.
62. Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. Walsh,
The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (1999).
63. Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark West, The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
791 (2002).
64. Mark West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (2001).
65. The relevant literature is discussed in La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 20, passim.
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identified, the relevant rules are found and coded, and then attempts
are made to make correlations.
Although one must admire the energy and ambition behind these
coding efforts, this genre of literature has been the subject of extensive criticism. First, it is said to focus too much on law on the books,
with inadequate attention to whether the law is actually enforced,66
and that when it does pay attention to enforcement issues, it again
looks at law on the books.67 Second, the literature’s descriptive account of the law is sometimes simply wrong or inconsistent.68
Related to the second critique is a third: that the indicia the literature focuses on do not in fact measure something useful. Some of the
shareholder rights measured in the literature supply only partial protection to shareholders and are easily circumvented.69 In other cases,
bad or good rules can be varied by contractual arrangements. In still
other cases, such as shareholders’ pre-emptive purchase rights for
new issues, it is not clear that shareholders—particularly minority
shareholders, who are the main objects of this literature’s concern—
are better off in a regime that mandates such rights and makes it
impossible for shareholders to decide that a different rule might be of
greater collective benefit.70 Cumulative voting, prized by the literature as a measure of small shareholder protection,71 is another
example. It has been criticized as in fact allowing greater power to
directors who are either shareholders themselves or hold the proxies
of smaller shareholders.72 More obviously, cumulative voting cannot
66. See, for example, the parlous state of enforcement in Indonesia described in
Andrew Rosser, Coalitions, Convergence and Corporate Governance Reform in Indonesia, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 319, 329 (2003); see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 244, 250-51 (2007).
67. See Coffee, supra note 66, at 244, 250–51.
68. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United
States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005);
Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—On the Fallacy of
LLSV (Univ. of Manchester Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=728403; Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited—
Further Evidence About Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom
(Univ. of Manchester Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=913968; Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La
Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights Index” Under Consistent Coding 68 (Harvard Law
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf.
69. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 4 n.6
(2001).
70. See Pistor et al., supra note 63, at 805 n.39.
71. See, e.g., Law and Finance, supra note 20, at 1127. In cumulative voting, each
shareholder gets a number of votes equal to the number of shares he holds multiplied
by the number of directors and can spread those votes over several candidates or concentrate them on one.
72. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 142-60 (1994).
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help the typical public shareholder in a listed company, who holds far
less than the minimum proportion—one divided by the total number
of directors—required to elect a single director. In a company with a
board of as many as twenty directors, the only kind of “small shareholder” who benefits from cumulative voting will be one who already
holds at least five percent.
Finally, it has been argued that the correlations this literature
finds are spurious and the product of data mining.73
On the other hand, some of the LLSV literature has shed valuable light on comparative questions. It was the LLSV literature that
showed how rare regimes of dispersed ownership actually are around
the world,74 suggesting therefore that rules designed for such a regime, where the main agency problem is the vertical one between
shareholders and management, are of limited transplantability to
countries where the main agency problem is the horizontal one between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. It
also suggested, although not irrefutably, that existing ownership
structures are an equilibrium response to domestic legal environments. Controlling shareholders in blockholder-dominated systems
do not lobby for more protection for minority shareholders, even
though that might increase overall firm value, probably because they
would lose more than they would gain by it.75
More generally, the problem pointed out over a decade ago by
Jonathan Macey remains:
[T]here are no generally accepted criteria for the appropriate
means to measure alternative systems of corporate governance. That is to say, there are no formalized, generally
accepted criteria for determining whether a particular system of corporate governance is working. Once such criteria
are developed, it should be possible to begin serious comparative empirical work in corporate governance.76
Macey proposes a set of criteria of his own. First, how successful is
the system in preventing managers from diverting firm resources to
private use? To answer this question, one could look at the premium

73. See Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (Univ. of Mich.
Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 02-009, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=318940 (correlating legal origins with World Cup success).
74. See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 20.
75. Bebchuk and Roe demonstrate this point mathematically in Lucien Arye
Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
76. Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional Investors and Corporate Monitoring: A Demand-Side Perspective in a Comparative View, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, at 903, 908.
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on voting over non-voting stock, or on control-block stock over noncontrol-block stock.77
Second, how willing are entrepreneurs to sell stock to the public?
In a well functioning system, entrepreneurs can credibly promise not
to expropriate investors, and therefore receive a high price for the
stock. In a poorly functioning system, their promise is worth much
less and so they receive much less from investors, making even honest entrepreneurs less willing to sell.78
Third, are there well functioning internal and external markets
for corporate control? If so, inefficient management can be replaced
by action of the board or by a hostile takeover.
While these criteria are good ones for particular purposes, they
are unlikely to solve the problem of general acceptance pointed out by
Professor Macey because they do not make explicit the goal that a
“working” corporate governance system ought to achieve. Is it control
of agency costs as between shareholders and management? Maximization of stock price? Maximization of contribution to gross
national product? None of these goals will command universal agreement. Yet without answering this question, it is impossible to know
how, for example, to weight the scores on the various suggested criteria for the purpose of comparing different regimes even if we could
come up with such scores.
IV. LESSONS

FROM

COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Despite the suspicion that it is somewhat dull work,79 taxonomy
in CCG has been quite illuminating. Scholars have distinguished between insider- and outsider-dominated systems, with the latter
relying more heavily on disclosure and markets than the former,80
and Hansmann and Kraakman classify corporate governance systems by their orientation to shareholders, managers, labor, or the
state.81 Gourevitch and Shinn go further to produce a typology of six
political coalitions resulting from different outcomes of alliance and
conflict between owners, managers, and workers.82
77. See id. at 910. On the latter measure, it seems, the United States scored well:
5.4% compared with Italy’s 82%. See id.
78. This is, of course, the lemons problem famously analyzed in George A. Akerlof,
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J.
ECON. 488 (1970).
79. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 128 (“The result [of the taxonomists’ work] was
an interesting, if somewhat dry, enterprise.”).
80. See generally Stilpon Nestor & John K. Thompson, Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is Convergence Under Way?, in ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19 (2001).
81. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43.
82. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 15, at 21, Table 2.3.
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CCG scholarship also led to the discovery that national systems
varied dramatically along dimensions of ownership—some countries
have large groups of related corporations (for example, chaebol in
South Korea, holding companies in Europe, keiretsu in Japan83);
others show patterns of family control (for example, Canada, Italy,
and Hong Kong); and others show relatively dispersed shareholding
(for example, the United States and the United Kingdom).84 A great
deal of CCG scholarship has been about trying to explain cross-country variations in patterns of corporate ownership. Different studies
have reached different conclusions, not all of them mutually reconcilable. But it is a sign of the vigor of the field that so many different
theories have been raised and discussed, and it is hardly a sign of
failure that no consensus on a definitive conclusion has yet been
reached.
The simplest hypothesis of the CCG literature is that economics,
and only economics, matters. Corporate governance is a technology of
business organization, just like lean production or indeed the assembly line itself. Countries faced with similar economic pressures will,
over time, adopt similar corporate governance institutions. Evolutionary processes will ensure the elimination of unsuccessful
competitors.85
CCG research has forced this hypothesis into some major qualifications. Significant differences do persist that are hard to explain as
the result of different competitive pressures.86 The response of the
“economics matters” school has essentially been to say that economics
matters within the constraints imposed by politics,87 which has
something of a tautological flavor, or to maintain that economics still
matters in the long run; that even though short- or mid-term differences may persist, long-term trends are decided by competitive
economic pressures.
83. Mark Ramseyer and Yoshiro Miwa challenge what they call the “myth” of the
keiretsu; see the discussion at supra note 36.
84. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 128-29.
85. This economic Darwinist explanation is discussed more fully and critiqued in
Part V.B below.
86. Doremus et al., for example, write:
[S]triking differences in firm behavior persist. These differences correlate
most obviously with corporate nationality, not with sectoral characteristics
or investment maturity . . . . Those differences . . . are systematic. Across
firms, sectors, and in the aggregate, only one set of behavioral variations
shines through: national ones.
PAUL N. DOREMUS, WILLAM W. KELLER, LOUIS W. PAULY & SIMON REICH, THE MYTH
OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION 139 (1999).
87. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or
Law?, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23 (1997). But see Romano, supra note 60, at 2037
(“[P]rivate parties are persistent in devising institutions that circumvent, or minimize
the effect of, political constraints on economic activity.”).
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A second hypothesis is that law matters. This is essentially the
message of the LLSV literature, which finds a correlation between
formal law on the one hand and systems of finance and corporate governance, including ownership patterns, on the other. Whether the
link is indeed one of cause and effect, and whether the link is more
than spurious, can be (and has been) debated.88 But in any case, the
hypothesis is out there, and it has not been decisively refuted.
A third hypothesis is that history and politics matter. This is, of
course, the position of Mark Roe, who argues, “The economic model
cannot alone explain foreign structures and their differences with the
American structures; it needs a political theory of American corporate finance to provide an adequate explanation.”89 This hypothesis
incorporates path dependency:90 different ownership patterns prevail
because of previous choices in corporate structures and corporate law
itself. Both result in regimes that are costly to change even though if
we were starting from scratch we might not choose them.
While the Roe hypothesis is far from unchallenged,91 it has inspired a number of inquiries into the details of various national
corporate governance regimes, and has proven a useful lens through
which to view national differences. It is hard to find a work of CCG
these days that does not cite Roe’s work on path dependency and the
importance of history and politics, even if it does not always completely agree with it.
A fourth hypothesis is that culture matters. A traditional concern of comparative law scholarship generally has been that of the
transplantability of laws and legal institutions. Will the transplant
take? Why or why not? Are there things that need to be considered
beyond market pressures and interest-group politics? The “culture
matters” school answers “Yes,” and the argument has been applied in
the corporate governance context. The problem with culture as an independent variable is that it is very susceptible to vague clichémongering, and often used by vested interests as a reason to oppose
change. Amir Licht is probably the scholar most prominently associated with an effort to be more rigorous about looking at the
relationship between culture and corporate law.92
Finally, another effort to get at deep-structure issues can be
called the “property rights matter” approach essayed by Curtis
88. The LLSV literature and critiques of it are discussed more fully in Part III.C
above.
89. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1935 (1993).
90. See generally Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 75.
91. See the discussion at supra note 31.
92. See Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY INT’L L.J. 195 (2004); Amir N. Licht, The
Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001).
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Milhaupt in his 1998 article, “Property Rights in Firms.” The hypothesis here is that we need to understand the claims on corporate assets
and behavior that can be made by state as well as private actors, and
that the security and predictability of property rights in a polity will
affect the ownership structure of firms. In particular, the claim is
that dispersed ownership is possible only in countries where private
property rights are highly secure, and that concentrated ownership is
a response to insecure property rights.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

AND

CHALLENGES

A. Comparative Corporate Ecology
One criticism leveled at the LLSV literature is that it mistakes
the rules on the books for actual practice. This is so in two ways.
First, it neglects enforcement issues. But perhaps more importantly,
it neglects the ways in which actors can often negotiate around the
rules if they wish, to the extent that Bernard Black has famously
called corporate law “trivial.”93 A contractarian theory of corporate
law would hold that the rules we see applying to participants in the
corporate enterprise are all rules that they have in some sense chosen. The LLSV literature in effect rejects by implication this theory of
corporate law without ever directly engaging it or even acknowledging its existence.
More broadly, CCG would benefit from a stronger focus on the
institutional environment for corporate governance.94 This means
comparing not just rules, no matter how well selected, but also the
various institutions that exist to make the rules meaningful, as well
as non-legal institutions that may work to accomplish the purposes—
for example, the reduction of agency costs—attributed to corporate
governance rules. A decade ago, for example, John Cioffi asserted
that
even under the liberal legal tradition and pluralist political
conditions in the United States, fiduciary duties cannot fulfill their governing function unless one assumes the
existence of powerful, pervasive, and effective extra-legal social mechanisms of norm internalization. Whatever the
moral force and effect of fiduciary duty law, the hypertrophy
of the business judgment rule reveals the impracticability of
structuring corporate governance through formal rights and
93. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990). Black does not actually assert that all corporate law is trivial in the sense that unwanted rules can be avoided at low cost. He
argues that where such rules cannot be avoided, political pressures will be brought to
bear to change them.
94. I have tried to do this myself in Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131 (2010).
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judicial enforcement . . . . Economically functional corporate
governance regimes thus require alternative or additional legal mechanisms of governance such as disclosure
regulations, proxy rules, board structure and operation, and
board and/or works council codetermination. Hence, corporate governance regimes and their reform reflect a politics of
institutional mechanisms.95
The last ten years have seen numerous studies of the “alternative or additional legal mechanisms” noted by Cioffi, plus others not
mentioned. A few scholars have produced comparative studies of
shareholder derivative actions, for example.96 And the CCG community is certainly aware of the importance of institutional context in
general. But further comparative research on many specific institutions is needed; surely interesting insights could be gained by
studying the role in other countries of the financial press or of gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants.97
B. The Issue of Convergence
A key question occupying CCG almost from the beginning has
been that of the prospects for convergence.98 Most of the arguments
on convergence—whether it is going to happen, and what pressures
exist either for or against it—were already out there in the literature
ten years ago.99 Yet there was no consensus then100 and there is none
now.
95. Cioffi, supra note 13, at 523-24 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
96. See, e.g., Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1436 (1994); Kristoffel Grechenig &
Michael Sekyra, No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe—A Model of Percentage
Limits, Collusion and Residual Owners (Columbia Univ. School of Law, Center for
Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 312, 2007); ALESSANDRO DE NICOLA,
SHAREHOLDER SUITS: THE ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND
DIRECTORS IN DERIVATIVE SUITS (2007); Scott H. Mollett, Derivative Suits Outside
Their Cultural Context: The Divergent Examples of Italy and Japan, 43 U.S.F. L. REV.
635 (2008-09). Professor Daniel Puchniak of the National University of Singapore’s
Faculty of Law is editing a forthcoming symposium volume tentatively entitled Derivative Actions in Major Asian Economies: Legislative Design and Legal Practice.
97. See Coffee, supra note 31 (studying gatekeepers in other countries).
98. In these globalizing times, corporate law’s leading question is whether
there is a national corporate governance system (or component thereof) that
possesses relative competitive advantage . . . . If only the fittest practices can
survive in the global market, it also becomes plausible to project that national governance systems will converge upon them and systemic differences
will disappear.
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40, at 216.
99. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 75; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40;
Gilson, supra note 28; Coffee, supra note 31.
100. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40, at 216 (“[A]s descriptions have become thicker and more cogent, answers to the bottom-line questions respecting
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The definition of insanity is said to be doing the same thing over
and over and expecting different results.101 If so many scholars after
so many years still cannot get any traction on the problem, perhaps
this is a clue that we are asking the wrong question.
The issue of convergence can be divided into three main sub-issues. First, why might it happen? Second, is it happening? Third, is it
a good thing?
The CCG literature has proposed several reasons why convergence might happen. Foremost among these explanations is the
economic Darwinist one: convergence will occur because one system
must necessarily be more efficient than the others, and that system
will prevail in economic competition between corporations. A typical
statement of this view is as follows:
In the long run, product market competition resulting
from the increased openness of national economies to foreign
trade may demonstrate which of the two local [corporate governance] optima is also optimal for the world as a whole.
While there may be no unique answer, it may turn out that
one or the other is better suited for particular industries.102
This view sees corporate governance as an organizational technology, and firms must adopt the best available technology to
survive.103 With the increased flow of information, lack of knowledge
about this technology is no longer an obstacle to its diffusion. Countries that fail to adopt efficient rules will suffer; their corporations

competitive advantage have become more elusive and convergence predictions have
become more qualified.”).
101. The expression is often attributed to Einstein or Franklin, but I have found no
specific citation.
102. Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy
and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 129, 186 (2009).
103. See Nestor & Thompson, supra note 80, at 35. An interesting field of research
within this approach is the degree to which there is a necessary correlation between
production technology and organizational technology. Ronald Gilson writes:
[I]t was thought that Japanese lean production, supported both by employees
rendered cooperative and inventive by lifetime employment, and by close,
long-term ties to suppliers, could not be matched without dramatic changes
in US governance institutions. In fact, American manufacturers adopted lean
production, but adapted lean production to fit their governance institutions,
rather than adapting their institutions to lean production.
Gilson, supra note 28, at 131-32. For more on the relationship between governance
and production systems in the United States and Japan, see Charles Sabel, Ungoverned Production: An American View of the Novel Universalism of Japanese
Production Methods and Their Awkward Fit with Current Forms of Corporate Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 28,
at 310.
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will be worth less, and will have a harder time raising capital. Business will suffer, or will move elsewhere.104
To be complete, this explanation must be supplemented by another one setting forth the mechanism by which competitive
adaptation takes place. The literature offers a number of suggestions:
technological determinism, in which similar problems dictate similar
solutions; emulation, where policymakers consciously imitate the
practices of other countries; elite networking, where a cosmopolitan
group of experts forms a consensus and then proselytizes it back in
the members’ home countries; harmonization, where policymakers
recognize interdependence and the need to avoid unnecessary incompatibilities; and penetration, where states face serious externally
imposed costs of some kind for not adopting converging structures.105
For example, investors might plausibly threaten to leave (or not to
come) if there is not reform. An interesting development in recent
years has been the explicit promotion of a corporate governance
agenda by international financial institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development
Bank.106
Whether political factors lead to convergence or divergence
seems to be indeterminate. Scholars such as Mark Roe have emphasized the importance of social-democratic politics in the making of
national corporate governance regimes.107 If he is right, then corporate governance will converge at about the same time politics
converges. Other scholars see politics as a force for convergence.
Mary O’Sullivan argues, for example, that while social democratic
values may drive political decisions, it does not follow that they will
drive corporate governance regimes. Quite the opposite may occur
(and, she argues, did occur in France in the 1990s108): if social democratic values mean that society assumes the cost of redundancies,
then it may be easier for corporations to make decisions that maximize profits and do not take labor and other “stakeholder” interests
into account.109
Indeed, it is not even undisputed that economic factors will lead
to convergence, as argued by the Darwinian view. The “varieties of
capitalism” perspective holds that
104. This story is presented in Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 75, at 134-38, although
it is not clear that they subscribe to it.
105. See LARRY CATÁ BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW 20 (2002).
106. See Rosser, supra note 66, at 320.
107. See ROE, supra note 30.
108. See O’Sullivan, supra note 47, at 53.
109. See id. at 63. On the other hand, the state’s reluctance to bear the cost of
generous redundancy benefits may lead to regulatory regimes that make it difficult
for employers to fire workers. For political sources of convergence generally, see id. at
30.
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an understanding of the foundations of economic performance suggests the persistence of diversity in systems of
corporate governance. [This perspective] emphasize[s] the
importance of institutional diversity for shaping enterprise
behaviour and economic performance. [It] reject[s] the assumption that there is one best way to organize an economy
and, in particular, that the free flow of economic resources
through “perfect” capital, labour and product markets will
lead to optimal economic outcomes.110
Moreover, the argument that firms must adopt international
norms in order to attract investment is empirically questionable. The
standard view is expressed by Nestor and Thompson, who state that
in an era of globalized capital markets, firms know that “in order to
tap this large pool of global financial resources, they need to meet
certain governance conditions.”111
Institutional investors also insist that companies respect international norms of governance, particularly concerning the
duties of management and controlling shareholders to respect the demands of minority investors concerning
transparency and the procedures for exercising corporate
control, especially at the shareholders meeting.112
This argument is not implausible on its face, and may well be
true at least at the margin and when all other things are equal. But
all other things are never equal, and the question is whether corporate governance survives as a decisive factor when other factors have
been taken into account. Particularly in emerging markets with poor
and unreliable disclosure, investment decisions are as often driven by
predictions about broad economic trends or government policies as
they are driven by company-specific matters such as governance.
Randall Morck found a high degree of synchronicity in stock prices in
emerging market countries, suggesting that investors in those markets pay more attention to systemic risk factors than to corporation110. Id. at 27 (internal references omitted). Further literature in this vein includes
MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001); RONALD
DORE, BRITISH FACTORY, JAPANESE FACTORY: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL DIVERSITY IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1973); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); David Soskice, The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A
Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE NEW EUROPE (Anthony B. Atkinson & Renato Brunetta eds., 1991); Richard Whitley,
Internationalization and Varieties of Capitalism: The Limited Effects of Cross-National Coordination of Economic Activities on the Nature of Business Systems, 5 REV.
INT’L POLIT. ECON. 445 (1998); RICHARD WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURING OF CHANGE IN BUSINESS SYSTEMS (2000).
111. Nestor & Thompson, supra note 80, at 20.
112. Id. at 34.
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specific information.113 The foreign business community has been
telling China for years that it must improve its corporate governance
regime or face a loss of investment, but the threat has proved empty.
And foreign investment continues in Russia, despite corporate governance practices described by Bernard Black and his co-authors
with terms such as “kleptocracy,” “looting,” and “plunder.”114 In
short, investment in many emerging markets seems to be driven by a
desire simply to be there, with little attention paid to the quality of
the company in which the investment is made.115
But even if economic pressures do drive firms toward a single
model, it does not follow that Darwinian selection will actually result
in convergence. First, for this result to obtain, selection pressures
brought about by corporate governance differences would have to operate quickly and massively. To say that selection pressures push
firms toward a particular destination is a different thing from saying
that they will actually arrive there, and to show that some structure
is efficient in the long run is not to show that at any given moment no
inefficient structures can be observed.116
113. See Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Market: Why Do
Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movement?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215
(2000); see also Art Durnev et al., Capital Markets and Capital Allocation: Implications for Economies in Transition, 12 ECON. OF TRANSITION 593 (2004); Merritt Fox et
al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102
MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003).
114. See Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:
What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, passim (2000). It is of course very plausible to suppose that foreign investment in Russia would be higher if it had better
corporate governance. The point is that it would also be higher if many other things
were true—for example, if oil prices were higher or if taxes were lower—and it may be
that investors are willing to overlook a lot of poor corporate governance if an investment has other attractive features.
115. An excellent if ultimately anecdotal account of this phenomenon is TIM CLISSOLD, MR. CHINA (2005), which tells the tale of how two investment managers lost half
a billion dollars in China. A recurring theme is the pressure they faced from investors
in their China fund to invest in something—anything—even when no good prospects
were available.
116. Miwa and Ramseyer, for example, while sometimes acknowledging that competitive pressures “drive firms toward” a firm-specific optimum number of outside
directors, elsewhere go much further and assert in effect that all firms are always
already there. See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints Them, What Do
They Do?: Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan 6 (Harvard Law Sch. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 374, 2002), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=326460 (analogizing a sub-optimal number of outside directors to $20 bills lying on the sidewalk in order to conclude that all firms in their
survey must already have the optimal number). This vastly overestimates the flexibility of human institutions. See also RATIONAL CHOICE 26 (Jon Elster ed., 1986)
(questioning the applicability of the biological analogy to economic activity on the
grounds that the economic environment changes rapidly relative to the speed with
which inefficient firms are eliminated from competition, and that therefore at any
given time we are likely to observe efficient and inefficient firms coexisting); Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 481, 503 (1985) (“The operation of alleged selection pressures is
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Even if one believes in the effect of selection pressures, they will
not push toward convergence unless the political, economic, and social environments for all competing firms are identical, such that the
same set of rules turns out to be optimal for all. While the economic
Darwinist view quoted above117 is intuitively appealing at first
glance, it ultimately fails for two reasons. First, corporate governance
structure is only one cost of production. There are many other reasons for differences between countries in production costs, and those
reasons might easily swamp any effect from corporate governance.
Second, and more important, the argument does not take into account the concept of comparative advantage and its role in
international trade. In a two-product world of wine and wheat, if it is
relatively cheaper in terms of wine for Ruritania to produce wheat
with Corporate Governance Regime X than for Freedonia to produce
it with Corporate Governance Regime Y, then Ruritania will end up
supplying wheat to the world even though Country N might be able
to produce it at lower absolute cost and even if the only difference in
production costs is the corporate governance regime.118 Thus, the
more efficient corporate governance regime, even if we define it on an
industry-by-industry basis, will not necessarily prevail unless all
other differences between countries have been removed.
Finally, if the story of selection pressures were true, then not
only would we see convergence in corporate governance, but we
would long ago have seen convergence in political and economic systems. All societies would look the same now. But they do not, and
therefore the optimal set of corporate governance rules in each society is likely to be different even if you believe that selection pressures
push companies toward optimality. Since corporations have not as an
empirical matter all migrated out of all countries except one (the one
that has the best rules), it must not be true that selection pressures
work the way the story says they do. In short, while it is plausible to
believe that selection pressures can push firms in a certain direction,
it is not clear that that is the same direction for all firms, and even if
it were the same direction, it is not clear that firms ever actually get
there.
. . . neither an object of study nor even a falsifiable proposition but rather an article of
faith.”). This footnote is taken from Clarke, supra note 94, at 150, n.64.
117. See text accompanying supra note 102.
118. The demonstration of this result must be left to the economics textbooks. See,
for example, PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY 11-37 (3d ed. 1994). Needless to say, the result depends on various simplifying assumptions. But the basic insight remains valid. An experienced
mechanic might be able to do six oil changes in an hour, as opposed to his apprentice,
who can do only three. But the mechanic will still leave oil changes to the apprentice
and focus on higher-value transmission repair work, since his income from using his
time in that way more than makes up for the lost income stemming from less efficient
oil change operations.

R
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Are we actually seeing convergence? Despite Hansmann and
Kraakman’s provocative bombshell, there is no consensus that we
are. In the advanced industrial countries, there has been little movement toward convergence. German-style co-determination, for
example, has not proven attractive to other countries, but the
Germans for their part show little inclination to reject it. In what for
CCG studies has traditionally been the key realm of shareholder
rights, an extensive recent study concludes that it is “a mixed picture.”119 There has been some convergence in management
compensation practices, but no noticeable convergence in the area of
defenses against hostile takeovers.120
At the same time, we should not overlook some important specific instances of convergence. Over the last several years, Japanese
corporate law has undergone “massive”121 revisions in what could be
called an American direction,122 culminating in the consolidated
Company Law of 2005. Most observers, however, maintain that despite revisions to the formal law, the practice of corporate governance
in Japan is changing only slowly.123
The same might be said about China. Given that the People’s
Republic of China did not even have a general corporate statute for
the first four-plus decades of its existence, the very adoption of such a
statute in 1993 could be viewed as a formidable example of convergence. More to the point, the 2005 revisions of China’s company and
securities laws were unquestionably in a direction that brought them
closer to, and not further from, the mainstream.124 Yet the reality of
119. MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 358 (2008).
120. See id. at 358-59 and sources cited therein.
121. Nottage, Wolff & Anderson, supra note 36, at 1, 2. A table showing the reforms is appended to the article; see id. at 11.
122. See R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese
Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 303-15 (2002) (discussing corporate and securities law reforms).
123. See Nottage, Wolff & Anderson, supra note 36, passim; John O. Haley, Heisei
Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms Really Changing Japan?, 19 J.
JAPANESE L. 5, 13 (2005) (concluding that although “the 1990s brought more separate
corporate law revisions than any other period of Japanese history . . . [,] the fundamentals of Japanese corporate governance have not changed.”). For a thoughtful
discussion of the debate over the extent of change, see Bruce E. Aronson, Changes in
the Role of Lawyers and Corporate Governance in Japan—How Do We Measure
Whether Legal Reform Leads to Real Change?, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 223
(2009).
124. For an analysis of revisions, see Nils Krause & Chuan Qin, An Overview of
China’s New Company Law, 28 COMPANY LAW. 316 (2007); Steven M. Dickinson, Introduction to the New Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 16 PAC. RIM L.
& POL’Y J. 1 (2007); Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China’s New Company Law and
Securities Law: An Overview and Assessment, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 229 (2006); on the
original Securities Law, see Roman Tomasic & Jian Fu, The Securities Law of the
People’s Republic of China: An Overview, 10 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 268 (1999); Xian Chu
Zhang, The Old Problems, the New Law, and the Developing Market—A Preliminary
Examination of the First Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, 33 INT’L
LAW. 983 (1999); Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership:
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corporate governance practices in China remains very different from
what appears in the statute books, and indeed is so opaque that it is
difficult to measure reliably where it is, let alone to know in what
direction it is moving.125
Finally, it is worth considering the question of whether convergence would be desirable even if we had it. Here the argument for
cross-national convergence or uniformity seems less compelling than
in other areas of the law. In transnational bankruptcy cases, for example, there is value in a system that ensures uniform principles of
distribution regardless of where the debtor’s property happens to be
or who first brings the case to court in which country. Consistent
rules of contract on matters such as offer and acceptance make business transactions more predictable and forum-shopping less
rewarding. But while there is general agreement that forum-shopping in those types of cases is a bad thing, there is much less
agreement that the corporate law equivalent of forum-shopping—
that is, incorporating in the jurisdiction that offers the best form of
business entity for one’s particular needs—should be discouraged.126
It has long been allowed in the United States, and is increasingly
allowed in Europe following the landmark Centros decision.127
Clearly, there is substantial political as well as intellectual force behind the idea that choice is a good thing. It has even been argued that
diversity in corporate governance regimes is per se a good thing, in
the same way that biological diversity is a good thing: it preserves
alternative ways of organizing that may prove superior to current
ways if the relevant environment changes.128
Chinese Securities Law, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115 (1996); on the original Company
Law, see Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273 (1995); Sunny Huo, The
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 373 (1995).
125. See generally Clarke, supra note 94.
126. There is, of course, a “race to the bottom” theory of jurisdictional competition
in corporate law that sees choice as a bad thing. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing
the United States); Laura Jankolovits, No Borders. No Boundaries. No Limits. An
Analysis of Corporate Law in the European Union After the Centros Decision, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 973 (2004) (discussing Europe).
127. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
11459. In that case, two Danish citizens and residents with no connections to the
United Kingdom established Centros Ltd. under English law. The company then attempted to register a branch in Denmark in order to do business there. (It was
assumed for the sake of the decision that the shareholders followed this procedure to
avoid Danish minimum capitalization requirements.) The Danish government refused registration, but the refusal was overturned by the European Court of Justice.
For a sample of commentary on the case, see Jankolovits, supra note 126; Wolf-Georg
Ringe, Sparking Regulatory Competition in European Company Law—The Impact of
the Centros Line of Case-Law and its Concept of “Abuse of Law,” in PROHIBITION OF
ABUSE LAW—A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW (R. de la Feria & S. Vogenauer
eds., forthcoming 2010).
128. See Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance—Possible, But
Not Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REV. 341, 382-83 (2002). The metaphor is a little strained; a
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The whole discussion of convergence in corporate law is, in fact,
oddly different from discussions of convergence in other fields of law,
because convergence in corporate law does not necessarily mean uniformity. For corporate governance models do not vary only on the
substantive rules they apply to business organizations. They vary
also on the degree to which they offer and respect choices about which
form of organization to use. Thus, if Model A offers one form and forbids the adoption of others, worldwide convergence to Model A might
mean the elimination of choice. But convergence to Model B might
mean the preservation of choice, if Model B is (for example) Delaware, which allows choice between a wide variety of organizational
forms, one of which—the Delaware business trust129—itself has virtually no mandatory rules.130
Given, then, that the very meaning of convergence is so uncertain, as well as the failure over so many years to come to any
consensus as to whether it is occurring, perhaps it is time to abandon
the crystal-ball approach to CCG studies. After all, what purpose is
really served by trying to figure out if convergence is inevitable or
not? There is value in determining which features of which system do
what well and do what badly. If policy advocacy has any real-world
effect, then one should advocate what seems to work well, regardless
of what direction the rest of the world is going in.
The debate about convergence seems really to be a debate about
the conclusion to a number of debatable premises, and it would be
better to debate the premises directly. In other words, the point is not
whether it will rain tomorrow. The point is whether cloud-seeding
today is an effective way to make it rain. The issues therefore become: (1) is there really a single best corporate governance system
that is determined solely by economics, and (2) what is the process by
which a country might come to adopt that system? Will it be the inevitable outcome of competitive processes, or might it not happen at all
without proper policy advocacy, with the result that a country could
become a laggard? These are the questions that matter from an academic and policy standpoint.

biological species, once gone, is gone for good, at least until Jurassic Park-like technology is invented. A species of organization, by contrast, can exist in the minds of
human beings even if there are no examples of it on earth, and thus can be resurrected any time someone thinks it might be useful.
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3824.
130. See Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 326 (2002) (the Delaware Business Trust Act
“contains highly permissive provisions, allowing promoters of business trust a staggering degree of freedom to design their relationships with beneficiaries-investors.”).
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C. Breadth of Focus
1. Focus on the Public Corporation
CCG studies have tended to focus on publicly listed corporations.
There are probably several reasons for this: they are the type of corporation that law professors tend to know best, and disclosure laws
around the world mean that they produce the most numbers for economists to crunch. Furthermore, such companies feature almost by
definition the involvement of small, passive shareholders, and thus
present public policy questions arguably not present in business entities involving a small number of people who bargain with each other.
Finally, if large public corporations dominate the economy, then the
value of studying them is self-evident.
Although the focus on public corporations is for all these reasons
understandable, it means that a great deal of interesting territory
has been left largely unexplored. American corporate law scholarship
and teaching has long been moving from a “corporations” approach to
a “business organizations” approach, and scholars such as Henry
Hansmann and Larry Ribstein have written extensively about alternative business structures.131 It is time for CCG to do the same. Nonpublic-corporation business organizations (NPCBOs) play a major
role not just in advanced industrialized economies,132 but even more
in the transition and emerging market economies that have become
increasingly important.133 They are major sources of employment,
and are an essential stage in the life cycle of the large, successful
public corporation. To focus on public corporations without understanding how NPCBOs operate, then, is to overlook a major part of
131. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); LARRY
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).
132. In the United States, for example, small businesses (not the same thing as
NPCBOs, but close enough for present purposes) have generated sixty to eighty percent of net new employment since the mid-1990s. See SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 2009, at 9 (2009).
133. See Frederick Nixson & Paul Cook, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in
Developing Countries, in FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: SURVEYS OF THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND POLICY 333, 333 (Christopher J. Green, Colin H. Kirkpatrick & Victor Murinde
eds., 2005) (“There is general agreement that small and medium sized enterprises . . .
have played a crucial role in the process of economic development.”); see also Christopher J. Green, Colin H. Kirkpatrick & Victor Murinde, Finance for Small Enterprise
Growth and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries, 18 J. INT’L DEVELOPMENT
1017 (2006); John Weeks, Small Manufacturing Establishments in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis, 17 INT’L REV. APPLIED ECON. 339 (2003); Paul Cook &
Frederick Nixson, Finance and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Development
(University of Manchester School of Economic Studies, Finance and Development Research Programme Working Paper Series, Paper No. 14, Apr. 2000), available at
http://tinyurl.com/yb8oezn; Moha Asri Abdullah, Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs): Some Pertinent Issues, in SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN ASIAN PACIFIC
COUNTRIES 3 (Moha Asri Abdullah & Mohd. Isa Bin Baker eds., 2000); CARL
LIEDHOLM & DONALD C. MEAD, SMALL ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(1999); Dennis Anderson, Small Industry in Developing Countries: A Discussion of
Issues, 10 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 913 (1982).
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the global economic landscape. Therefore, if the CCG approach has
any value at all, attention to NPCBOs would benefit scholars and
policymakers from all types of jurisdictions: common law and civil
law, advanced economies and developing economies.
What insights might such an approach yield? If we accept a basic
premise of CCG scholarship—that national differences in the governance of public corporations matter for national economic
performance—then we must also accept the premise that national
differences in the governance of NPCBOs also matter (assuming
NPCBOs matter at all in the economy). This in turn suggests the possibility that to the extent the current perceived superiority of
American over Japanese capitalism can be attributed to differences
in corporate governance, we should study the differences not in the
governance of large, public corporations—after all, General Motors
did not outperform Toyota—but rather in the way innovative startups such as Apple and Google could be governed and funded through
venture capital.134
2. Focus on the Boundaried Firm
As noted earlier in the Article, the focus of CCG studies, particularly in the United States, has tended to be on the relatively narrow
set of issues involving the relationship between shareholders and
managers—in other words, on corporate law and securities law. Some
voices have urged greater attention to labor issues.135 But the desirability of broadening CCG’s focus goes beyond the familiar shareholder
vs. stakeholder conceptions of the corporation. Those competing conceptions still have one important thing in common: a vision of the
corporation as a well-defined entity, with insiders and outsiders, employees and non-employees, shareholders and creditors.
But CCG, at least as practiced by legal scholars, needs to come to
grips with patterns of industrial organization in which the boundaries of the firm are by no means clear. As William Klein pointed out
almost three decades ago, although “[t]he notion that activity is organized either within firms or across markets does seem useful” for
some purposes,
[t]he types of organization people use to accomplish their economic goals, however, vary greatly; one can draw a clear
line between firms and nonfirms only by adopting simplistic
and unhelpful definitions. More realistically, one should envision a spectrum with varying degrees of “firmishness” and
treat the firm not as an entity, but as an abstraction that
134. I am grateful to Barry Naughton for suggesting this point.
135. See, e.g., Cioffi, supra note 13, at 524.

\\server05\productn\C\COM\59-1\COM102.txt

106

unknown

Seq: 32

21-DEC-10

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

12:54

[Vol. 59

facilitates the examination of complex relationships among
different actors.136
In his 1983 article “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Stephen Cheung argued that the notion of a firm with boundaries made
no sense and that, from an economist’s standpoint, “it is futile to
press the issue of what is or is not a firm.”137 And Ronald Coase himself, in his seminal article “The Nature of the Firm,” admitted that “it
is not possible to draw a hard fast line which determines whether
there is a firm or not.”138
The essential insight of all three authors is that the complexity of
explicit and implicit contractual relationships among all those involved in production often makes it impossible, and indeed pointless,
to say who is inside the firm and who is outside.139 In real life, of
course, it has long been true that a great deal of production takes
place within the traditional hierarchical firm analyzed in Alfred
Chandler’s classic work, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.140 But that has not been true
everywhere141 or in all industries,142 and it may well be less true in
the future as developments in communications and transportation
technology make the economic environment more hospitable to what
has been called the “virtual firm” or the “networked company.”143
So far, however, these insights into the complexities of contracting have not been extensively explored in the CCG literature.
What might such an exploration show—that is, what insights might
136. William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1982) (internal footnotes omitted).
137. Stephen N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1,
18 (1983).
138. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391 (1937).
139. This is not to deny that sometimes the law requires us to make precisely those
distinctions. Consider the number of politicians and would-be government officials
who have had “nanny tax” issues precisely because they treated their nannies as independent contractors (outside the firm, so to speak) when they should have treated
them as employees (inside the firm) and paid social security taxes.
140. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
141. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2636, 2649 and passim (2000) (noting extensive use of subcontracting in the Japanese automobile industry and describing the automobile manufacturers as
“assemblers”).
142. Consider, for example, mutual funds, which outsource virtually all their activities, see Schools Brief: Moneyed Men in Institutions, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1999, at 83,
83; the technology industry in Silicon Valley, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); and
the construction industry, see William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organization in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production Under
High Uncertainty, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 137 (2004).
143. See Remo Häcki & Julian Light, The Future of the Networked Company, 3
MCKINSEY Q. 26 (2001); Anne E. Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22
DEL. J. CORP. L. 497 (1997).
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be gained by approaching comparative corporate governance from a
“firmishness” perspective? Such a perspective means abandoning the
focus on the large integrated firm and opening up our field of vision to
networks of many small firms connected by formal or informal contractual relations in a production chain; it means abandoning the
effort to figure out if those relationships should be labeled hierarchical ones of ownership or horizontal ones of contract. In such a
network, the concept of “corporate governance” would have to be
broadened to mean institutions intended to prevent, at reasonable
cost, excessively opportunistic behavior by network members.144
As discussed earlier, a core concept of corporate governance in its
traditional sense is the idea that all participants in the corporate enterprise have an interest in assuring minority investors that their
powerlessness will not be unduly exploited; this is the only way they
can be induced to invest in the first place. Similarly, network members need some assurance that other members will not take
advantage of their transaction-specific investments to hold them
up.145 Comparative corporate governance from a “firmishness” perspective would look at the various arrangements in different societies
that appear to prevent the kind of excessive opportunism that would
cause production networks to collapse.
One reward might be a better understanding of the trade-offs between contractual governance arrangements and hierarchical
ownership arrangements, and perhaps even insights into arrangements that are completely outside this duality. For example, vertical
integration is often thought of as the solution to excessive contracting
costs—costs that include not only negotiation, but also enforcement.
In societies where contracts cannot be reliably enforced, we would expect to see a higher degree of vertical integration. But do we? China
poses the example of highly specialized production chains involving
complex networks of firms not tied together through vertical integration, and yet its courts are generally considered unreliable as
contract enforcers. What institutions are performing the governance
function, and what do we find in other countries that appear to exhibit the same combination of weak contract enforcement and low
levels of vertical integration?
3. Moving Beyond the Traditional Jurisdictions
As the previous point suggests, CCG would benefit by moving to
newer and more exotic—but still very important—jurisdictions and
144. I specify “excessively” because network members cannot be expected to be fiduciaries for each other; a certain amount of selfish behavior must be expected and
allowed.
145. The concept of asset specificity and the vulnerability this entails is discussed
extensively in WILLIAMSON, supra note 9.

\\server05\productn\C\COM\59-1\COM102.txt

108

unknown

Seq: 34

21-DEC-10

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

12:54

[Vol. 59

truly taking account of foreignness. This means countries like India
and China. The challenge is that they are going to look in some respects very familiar, with familiar forms. But in other respects they
are quite different, especially China, since at least India shares a
common legal tradition with the United States (and, more directly,
England). Even that, however, can be misleading. How well can India
fit into theories of legal governance designed for the United States or
Europe when simple cases can drag on for decades?146 Both of these
countries are going to challenge legal scholars to think about how corporate governance can work when it cannot rely on a reasonably
efficient court system. Can gatekeepers and reputation effects do all
the work? And if so, does this suggest that a sound court system, even
in countries where it exists, is not as important as we might have
thought?
4. Contingency of Problem Issues
One of the original insights from CCG was that others are not
necessarily concerned with the same problems that we are. This in
turn is a lesson about the contingency of our own concerns; maybe
there are problems we should be worrying about other than shareholder-management agency costs. Back in 1996, Edward Rock wrote
about the comparative scholarship of Richard Buxbaum, for whom
the interesting question was not how we can make managers sufficiently accountable to shareholders, but rather “why society permits
the establishment and persistence of massive private concentrations
of economic and political power over which the political process exercises relatively little control.”147 Comparative scholarship can thus
show us that what we think is fundamental may not be so fundamental, and that we may be taking for granted issues that outsiders find
of intense interest.
CCG has not really taken up this challenge. By and large it is
still interested in the basic issue of convergence or divergence, and
the fundamental issue is that of reducing agency costs. The virtues
and vices of dispersed ownership versus blockholding are typically
discussed in terms of their monitoring capacities, not in terms of, say,
their contribution to social cohesion.
Of course, it can be objected that this is outside the realm of corporate governance studies, properly understood. But what does and
does not count as corporate law is also a contestable proposition. If
one defines corporate law as the law governing the relationship be146. See Jeremy Page, Delhi Judges Face 466 Years’ Hard Labour, THE TIMES, Feb.
17, 2009, available at http://tinyurl.com/c98qsp (even working at its current rate of
less than five minutes per case and assuming the rate of new filings does not increase,
it will take the Delhi High Court 466 years to clear its current backlog of cases).
147. Rock, supra note 11, at 389.
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tween shareholders and managers, then almost by definition it is
going to be about the agency costs of this relationship, and one can
persuasively claim that corporate law neither does nor should deal
with the claims of employees, customers, etc.
But if corporate law is defined more broadly as a kind of business
law, then it is clear that we do have a lot of law dealing with these
claims, and in different ways.148 Let me be clear: I am not advocating
here a stakeholder theory of corporate governance as a normative
matter. I want only to make the point that a focus on agency costs is
not self-evidently the only way to go in comparative work. Simple and
even self-evident though this point may be, it does suggest a new
area of research in CCG: the comparative meta-study, as it were, of
the key issues in corporate governance as they are perceived in different societies. Current research is focused largely on understanding
the different ways in which legal systems solve similar problems. But
there is much to be gained from understanding the different ways in
which societies understand the problems they face. Not only can this
alert us to the potential importance of problems we may have overlooked or deemed trivial, but it can also help us understand why
transplants go wrong: the adopting jurisdiction may not have understood the problem the transplanted institution was designed to
address in the home jurisdiction.149
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the somewhat undertheorized nature of the comparative
project generally, CCG has proven a successful approach to corporate
governance scholarship, if success is measured by the ability to generate interesting insights that provoke further scholarship and seem
likely to continue to do so. This Article’s call to enlarge the scope of
CCG scholarship is not a lamentation of its failures but an appreciation of its accomplishments.
One of CCG’s important successes is really an achievement of
corporate law scholarship generally, and that is to bring comparative
law—an interest in what people in other countries do—into the mainstream of a branch of American legal scholarship. Corporate law
scholars who do not do CCG are still likely to be familiar with much
of what this Article has discussed, and to have read at least some of
the literature. Much of this popularization of CCG has occurred in
148. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109-33
(2004).
149. See, for example, the discussion of how Chinese corporate governance discourse looks at the separation of ownership and control, text accompanying supra
notes 54-56; see generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
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the last decade or so. One does not see a pervasive sense of American
exceptionalism in the field of corporate law; even those who think we
do it better than foreigners have some sense of how foreigners actually do it, and there have been periods in which the mainstream view
was that foreigners do it better than we do. Regardless, therefore, of
how the debates on convergence or other issues come out, corporate
law scholars can give themselves a pat on the back for that.

